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The diversity of developed countries’ pension system
designs today reflects these systems’ different histor-
ical origins and social philosophies,as well as the po-
litical difficulties involved in reforming any social in-
stitution that provides income for a large share of the
electorate.Whereas a large public sector role in pen-
sion provision remains the defining feature,a notice-
able and uniform cross-country development in re-
cent years has been the growing importance of pri-
vate schemes in global pension provision.1 Private
pension provision has expanded due to concerns
about the long-term sustainability of government fi-
nances in an era of ageing populations and from the
associated need to diversify the sources of retirement
income to ensure adequacy and life time income
smoothing. Principally private pension schemes are
thus intended to complement, rather than fully re-
place,reformed and possibly scaled-back public pen-
sion systems.
The vehicle of choice for introducing complementary
private pension provision has been the defined con-
tribution (DC) account. Here workers during their
working life pre-fund retirement income by paying
contributions into an account which is then invested
in real economic assets enabling investment returns
to be added to the workers’ contributions.DC retire-
ment plans can be individual or occupational (i.e.,
typically organised by industry or at the firm-level).
Introducing a DC pension plan option works to ad-
dress at least three interrelated long-term challenges
facing countries’ pension systems:
1. The fiscal challenge facing governments from
ageing populations;complementary DC plans can
over time account for a substantial share of re-
tirement income for especially higher income
groups. In this way future unfunded long-term li-
abilities for governments are reduced.
2. The savings challenge of getting people to save
more for their own retirement; complementary
DC plans offers a simple,transparent and (usual-
ly through tax-preferences) financially lucrative
vehicle for personal saving towards retirement.At
the same time, accumulated DC assets in com-
plementary plans assist in raising the national sav-
ings rate and (given the persistence of investment
home bias) the domestic private capital stock and
productive capacity in an economy.
3. The labour input challenge of ensuring that ageing
populations do not lead to labour shortages
through premature retirement; complementary
DC accounts – via their direct link between con-
tribution levels and retirement income – provide
straightforward individual incentives to remain
longer in the labour force. It is not a coincident
that recent surveys of workers’ retirement inten-
sion in the hardest hit countries, such as the
Ireland,United States and the UK (see below),in-
dicate that many expect to retire later as a result
of the crisis.2An “automatic stabiliser”-type effect
on labour force participation among older work-
ers from incurred DC retirement savings losses
seems to be occuring.Moreover DC pension plan
contributions made towards individuals’ own re-
tirement are less likely to be perceived as an ad-
ditional tax on income and thus avoid the adverse
effects of high taxation on aggregate labour input.
The crucial final point is illustrated in Figure 1,which
plots the total tax wedge on labour income and an-
nual average hours worked per capita for high income
OECD countries in 2008.3
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1 This paper follows the pension taxonomy presented in OECD
(2005).Private pensions include personal and occupational pensions
in both mandatory and voluntary form.Design can be both defined
benefit and defined contribution.
2 See IPE.com (2009) and Helman et.al. (2009).
3Total tax wedge data from OECD (2009a) includes employer pay-
roll taxes. Average annual hours worked per capita data incorpo-
rates country differences in labour force participation, unemploy-
ment, frequency of part-time work and hours worked by full-time
employed.Working hours data is from The Conference Board,Total
Economy Database, June 2009,
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While it is always dangerous to infer causation from
correlation, Figure 1 illustrates the difficulties many
OECD countries, especially in continental Europe,
face in raising taxes further to pay for future increas-
es in government pension (and other age-related) ex-
penditures. The relationship between average taxa-
tion levels and average labour input is strongly neg-
ative. Such constraints on reform policy space will
continue to nudge the most affected governments in
the direction of relying more on complementary DC
pension schemes to finance retirement incomes in the
future.
The shift from defined benefit to defined
contribution is not just a one-way street
It is frequently stated that the shift towards comple-
mentary corporate pension provision in the form of
DC schemes, especially in the US and UK, is a detri-
mental development to workers, as DC plans often
replace older corporate-defined benefit (DB) plans.
In DB plans recipients’ benefit levels are guaranteed
in a manner resembling public pension systems and
typically related to an employee’s salary level, em-
ployment duration and other factors.However,a nar-
row view of the DB-to-DC pension provision shift as
bad for workers is erroneous and often based on an
overly rosy view of corporate DB pensions.Certainly
a DC scheme replacing a DB pension entails a large
transfer of investment risk from the sponsoring cor-
poration to the individual worker, whose retirement
benefit levels will reflect only the balance in the DC
account at the time of retirement. Yet as Baily and
Kirkegaard (2009, 369–73) explain, a DB pension
plan inherently contains a series
of other risks to workers:
1. Funding risk; DB plan spon-
sors contribute too little to the
pension plan to cover pro-
mised liabilities
2. Portfolio risk; DB plan spon-
sors invest DB pension assets
at a loss
3. Bankruptcy risk;DB plan spon-
sors encounter financial prob-
lems and cannot honour pen-
sion promises
4. Portability risk; Employees
leave the DB plan sponsoring
company before acquiring full
vested pension rights
5. Inflation risk; Unlike public pensions which are in-
variably annually adjusted to increases in wages/
consumer prices,private DB pension plans (almost)
never contain such protection of future purchasing
power.Similarly to DC plans retirees therefore bear
the full cost of inflation after retirement.
Different variations of government mandated oblig-
atory safety-nets for DB pension benefits,such as the
Public Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) in
the United States, the UK Pension Protection Fund
(PPF) or the Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein auf Gegen-
seitigkeit (PSVaG) in Germany alleviates the first
three risks for workers,but at an invariably addition-
al funding and administrative cost to all DB plan
sponsoring companies. Furthermore, as Baily and
Kirkegaard (2009, 363–69) state, it is important to
note that corporate DB pension plans providing a sig-
nificant share of the total retirement income never
rose above approximately 40 percent of the total
workforce in any country, but were instead over-
whelmingly concentrated among executives and male
employees in erstwhile large manufacturing compa-
nies.With the accelerating shift in developed econo-
mies’ employment towards SMEs and the services
sectors,it is therefore highly unlikely that even a sta-
bilisation of overall corporate complementary pen-
sion provision could have been achieved without a
rapid shift towards DC plans. DB plans contain in-
herent hard-to-hedge longevity risk (the risk for DB
plan sponsors that retirees live and receive benefits
longer) and the financial management and compli-
ance costs of DB pension plans far exceed those of
DC plans (Baily and Kirkegaard 2009, 382–88).This
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Figure 1burden of a DB plan sponsorship. Moreover, porta-
bility risk looms larger for workers in the more dy-
namic services sectors, in which frequent job switch-
es is far more prevalent than in the longer tenured
manufacturing sectors.In many regards,DC accounts
are therefore better suited for a more flexible and in-
dividualised labour market of the 21st century.
The impact of the current global economic crisis
on DC pension plans
However,the timing of the global economic crisis has
brought the importance of investment risk contained
in DC plans into sharp focus and discussions of their
merit must take into account the perfect storm to hit
participants in private DC pension systems during the
current global economic crisis. Figure 2 shows early
indicative figures for private pension fund investment
returns in select OECD countries in 2008–09.
It can be seen how 2008 performances range between
35 and 25 percent losses in Ireland and the US and
small 2008 gains in Germany, Korea and Turkey.
Meanwhile,it is also clear that the stock and other as-
set market rebound in the first half of 2009 has,in the
most severely affected countries, only made up for a
limited share of losses incurred earlier in the crisis.As
such, focusing on relatively high average investment
returns in the “long run”is not a luxury many DC par-
ticipants have,for whom a single year of very poor re-
turns in 2008 was particularly badly timed.As laid out
in OECD (2009c, 26–27) two groups of DC pension
participants are most strongly affected by the crisis:
First individuals near retirement age with limited
time to make up for recent investment losses and with
relatively large shares of their prospective retirement
income coming from their DC accounts, especially if
they had a large exposure to risky assets (equities) or
if they are legally required to annuitise their DC bal-
ances immediately upon retirement. And secondly,
retirees who did not annuitise their DC balance up-
on retirement and consequently post-crisis must live
off income from a potentially much reduced DC ac-
count balance. Particularly the former group of peo-
ple currently close to retirement age is potentially
very large,as it includes the majority of the large ba-
by-boomer generations in many OECD countries.
For instance in the United States, 2008 was the year
in which people born after WWII could for the first
time take early retirement under Social Security at
age 62. Furthermore, the current crisis is global in
scope rendering standard geographic portfolio diver-
sification strategies less effective and in many OECD
countries has also adversely affected the value of
workers’ largest non-financial asset, namely their
homes. Hence, the current economic crisis has se-
verely affected the retirement income security of
some participants in DC schemes and done so more
immediately than similarly aged participants in DB
plans or recipients of public pay-as-you-go pension
benefits.
At the same time, though, the overall magnitude of
the impact of the current economic crisis on private
DC plan participants should not be exaggerated.First
of all,public social safety nets,typically guaranteeing
a minimum income or operating through means-test-
ing, act as automatic stabilisers and prevent retire-
ment income from falling too low,even if individuals
have suffered very large losses in their DC account
during the current crisis. Secondly, younger workers
will have ample time to make up
for recently incurred investment
losses before their retirement.
And thirdly,but most important-
ly,as a consequence of the recent
strong growth in the number of
countries implementing DC pen-
sion schemes, most of these are
still relatively modest in size and
thus account for only a small part
of workers’ total retirement in-
come.This last point is illustrated
in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows the recorded as-
sets held in DC and hybrid/mixed
accounts at the end of 2008 in 
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35 countries included in the OECD’s Global Pension
Statistics data.4 In only nine countries do private DC
and hybrid/mixed assets account for more than
20percent of GDP,while in most countries which had
by 2008 introduced DC plans, such assets still ac-
counted for only a very small share of GDP. Cor-
respondingly, even large investment losses in private
DC accounts in most countries will therefore not have
affected total retirement income that much, as it is
still overwhelmingly made up of payments from pub-
lic and/or private DB pension schemes. This is indi-
cated in the parentheses,which for the nine countries
with the largest DC and hybrid/mixed mix plan assets
shows how retirement income in these countries from
all types of private pensions is generally around half
of average total retirement income5 and only in
Denmark accounts for 60 percent. As such, even in
countries with the largest accumulated DC and hy-
brid/mixed plan assets, the fact that total retirement
income comes from several different sources signifi-
cantly eases the negative income impact of DC in-
vestment losses.
The investment losses suffered by DC pension plan
participants in the current crisis has clearly under-
lined the need for maintaining a mixture of public and
private sources of retirement income for the vast ma-
jority of future retirees in developed countries.
However, the economic crisis has
adversely affected not just DC
pension investments but has also
caused, as a result of the unpre-
cedented fiscal stimulus enacted
since early 2008,a very significant
long-term deterioration in public
finances across the OECD. Yet,
the long-term costs of ageing pop-
ulations for governments have not
diminished.6Another result of the
economic crisis is therefore that
the need for governments to en-
sure that people save more to-
wards their own retirement in-
come security has increased dra-
matically. Preserving some of the
government income safety net has proven crucial dur-
ing the crisis, but the need for expanded reliance on
pre-funded DC-type pension schemes to fund in-
creasing shares of total retirement income has be-
come equally evident.
The road forward for DC pensions
Following the collective failure of the financial ser-
vices sector to protect retirement savings and finan-
cial stability,measures must be taken in many OECD
countries to restore public confidence and address the
investment risk in DC pensions.In many ways it is for-
tunate that the current crisis has,as Figure 3 shows,hit
before many countries’ private DC pension systems
mature, as this allows for policymakers to make nec-
essary reforms in light of the recent economic crisis
before DC schemes make up a large share of total re-
tirement income and political opposition to reforms
increase.Broadly speaking the larger a share DC pri-
vate pension plans make up of total retirement in-
come the more stringent regulation will likely need to
be.An effective and sustainable post-crisis private DC
pension system should contain several broad charac-
teristics to ensure widespread participation and bet-
ter protection against investment risk:
1. Auto-Enrolment with an Opt-Out;The very pos-
itive effects on participation in DC pension
schemes from auto-enrolment with an opt-out
clause7 makes this “nudging” approach advanta-




































































































































































































































































































































































Sources: OECD (2009c); OECD Global Pension Statistics and Watson (2009).
DC AND HYBRID/MIXED PLAN ASSETS
Percent of GDP in 2008 or latest available
in % of GDP
(a) Data from 2006
Figure 3
4 Hybrid/mixed accounts are very small compared to standard DC
assets and include pension schemes with some characteristics of
both DB and DC plans.See OECD (2005,14) for details.Only coun-
tries with recorded DC and hybrid/mixed assets are included in fig-
ure 2. Data include retirement assets held in all contract types, i.e.
standard pension funds, insurance contracts and investment com-
pany and bank managed contracts.
5 No data is available for retirement income broken down by types
of public and private pension plans.The data in parentheses there-
fore refer to country shares of total retirement income coming from
all private pension schemes, including DB plans.
6 See for instance European Commission (2009) for a forceful state-
ment of this point.
7 See for instance Madrian and Shea (2000) and Beshears et. al.
(2006).geous, especially for attracting traditionally low-
saving low income groups.Carefully designed and
relatively conservative “default options” for pro-
crastinating savers who do not choose an invest-
ment portfolio or pension plan should also be in-
cluded in auto-enrolment provisions.
2. Age-linked Retirement Portfolios; Very large
losses among older workers with large portfolio
exposures to risky assets during 2008 point to the
advantages of automatic age linking of DC pen-
sion plans. According to this system,workers’ DC
portfolio would automatically shift towards less
risky assets as they approach retirement.A one-
size-fits-all approach would not be appropriate,
given the large differences in workers’ other re-
tirement assets (i.e.,home values and general ac-
cess to public transfers in old age).Rather a range
of several different “portfolio age-link options”
for DC pensions could shrink investment risk for
participants nearing retirement age. Age-linked
retirement portfolios could be promoted by lim-
iting tax preferences for DC pension plans that do
not offer such automatic links or do not automat-
ically and sufficiently restrict the share of risky as-
sets in a retirement portfolio as the participants
nears retirement.
3. Compulsory Phased Annuitisation;Longevity risk
and the risk of sudden asset price declines ad-
versely affecting income security for retirees with
large DC portfolios makes compulsory annuitisa-
tion (in effect the conversion of a DC balance in-
to a DB pension plan) upon retirement sensible.
Compulsory annuitisation would have to include
some measure of inflation protection, too. Yet
volatile asset prices, combined with requirements
of immediate annuitisation upon retirement ex-
poses retirees to the risk of having to purchase an
annuity at the bottom of their DC portfolio value.
Instead, annuitisation should only be compulsory
in phases.This could mean that annuitisation is on-
ly compulsory within a certain time period fol-
lowing retirement,say within 3–5years,or that on-
ly a certain (but relatively high) percentage of the
total DC balance has to be converted narrowly
around retirement. Given the difficulties for pri-
vate businesses in hedging inflation protected an-
nuities, governments would, as described in Visco
(2009, 155–58), need to play an active direct role
in annuity markets to ensure that reasonably
priced products would be available to retirees.
4. No Reliance on Financial Education; It is often
argued that there is an urgent need to improve the
financial education of the general public in order
for them to be able to better manage their own re-
tirement savings. While better educational stan-
dards are of course generally socially desirable,
the recent economic crisis has however illustrat-
ed how the vast majority of highly sophisticated
portfolio managers and financial experts “got it
all horribly wrong”. Healthy scepticism should
therefore greet any expectation that improved fi-
nancial education of the general public will have
any discernable effect on their retirement income
security. Rather than attempting to arm the gen-
eral public to better battle the DC retirement
product sales forces of a profit oriented financial
services sector, government pension regulators
and enforcement agencies should emphasise that
the utmost simplicity be utilised,when specifying
requirements for retirement product disclosure
and fee structures.
5. Credible Ring-Fencing of DC Retirement Assets;
During periods of acute financial stress, it can be
tempting for governments to promote consump-
tion by facilitating early access to private DC re-
tirement assets, because, as Willie Sutton said of
the reason for him to rob banks,“That’s where the
money is”. However, such easing of access re-
strictions to tax preferred retirement assets is mis-
guided for the vast majority of DC pension plan
participants.Bringing forward consumption spend-
ing from retirement to one’s working life means
intertemporally transferring assets away from a
period with few alternative ways of earning in-
come. Similarly such transfers will invariably ag-
gravate any adequacy concerns for future retire-
ment income. Policy makers must therefore end
all opportunities for “hardship withdrawals” to
avoid leakage of tax-preferred assets needed to
ensure retirement income.
6. A Constant Focus on Lowering Administrative
Costs; For DC pension plans to offer persistent
high returns to participants, it is crucial that pen-
sion system administrative and overhead costs 
are kept as low as possible and that government
policy and regulation are explicitly designed to
achieve this result. The recent successful experi-
ences in Sweden’s pension system deserve addi-
tional attention in this regard.Administrative cost
consciousness for instance suggests,as economies
of scale exists in DC contribution collection and
asset pooling, that this task is best carried out by
a single centralised entity.Costly advertising cam-
paigns by the financial services sector for DC pen-
sion plan-type products aimed directly at poten-
tial participants must similarly be avoided.
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